Greek Texts & Translations

To prove that I am speaking the truth, I shall bring before you Megacleides himself as a witness to these facts.Deposition

52.22You see, men of the jury, how intimate Lycon was with Callippus. He neither called him in for consultation about his affairs, nor did he ever put up at the home of Callippus as a guest; and this very fact is the one thing to which the plaintiff's friends have not ventured to depose, that, namely, he ever did put up at his house; for they knew well that, if they told any such lie as this, they would at once be convicted by the slaves when these were put to the torture. 52.23But I wish to mention to you a piece of circumstantial evidence so striking, that it will, I think, convince you that Callippus has uttered nothing but a pack of lies. If Lycon, men of the jury, had been as fond of the plaintiff and as intimate with him as the plaintiff claims, and had wished to give him this money as a present in the event of anything happening to himself, 52.24would it not have been better to have left the money outright in the custody of Callippus, in which case, if he returned safe, he would have recovered it duly and justly from one who was his friend and his proxenos, and, if anything had happened to him, he would have given the money outright as he purposed? Would this, I ask, not have been better than leaving it in the bank? For my part, I think the former course would have been fairer and more highminded. However, he is seen to have done nothing of the kind, so you must regard this as presumptive evidence; no; he gave written and oral instructions that it was to Cephisiades that the money was to be paid.

52.25I would have you regard the following point also, men of the jury. Callippus was one of your citizens, a man able both to render a service and to do an injury, while Cephisiades was a resident alien and a person without influence; so one cannot suppose that my father would have taken the side of Cephisiades in defiance of justice rather than do what was right for the plaintiff. 52.26Ah, but he will say perhaps, that my father got some private profit out of the money, and therefore took sides with Cephisiades rather than with the plaintiff. Then we are to believe, in the first place, that he wronged a man who would be able to do him injury to twice the amount of his gains, and secondly that my father in this instance was a base lover of gain, whereas in regard to special taxes and public services and gifts to the state he was not. 52.27And did he, who never wronged a stranger, wrong Callippus? And did the plaintiff, as he alleges, tender an oath to my father as to one who was a worthy man and would tell no falsehood, and yet does he now speak of him as a base fellow, who erases records of deposits? And, if my father refused to take the oath, as the plaintiff claims, or to make payment, how could he have escaped immediate condemnation? Who can believe this, men of the jury? I certainly think no one can. 52.28And has Archebiades forsooth sunk to such an extreme of baseness as to testify against Callippus, a fellow-demesman of his own, one in public life, and an official, and to say that I am telling the truth while Callippus is lying, and all this, when he knows that, if Callippus chooses to proceed against him for false testimony, or to do no more than put him on oath, he will be compelled to take whatever oath Callippus may require? 52.29And again, can anyone persuade you that Archebiades would perjure himself in order that Cephisiades, a resident alien, might get the money, or Phormion either, a man whom Callippus charges with having expunged some records of deposit? It is not a probable thing, men of the jury. Nor is it right to judge either Archebiades or my father guilty of any act of baseness; you know that my father was too emulous of honor to indulge in any base or shameful practices, and that his relations with Callippus were not such as to lead him through contempt to do him an injury. 52.30Callippus indeed does not appear to me to be a man of such slight importance as to be treated with contempt—a man of such influence that last year, after he had instituted this action against me, and had challenged me to refer the matter to Lysitheides for arbitration (and I, although scorned by him, yet took wise counsel in this at any rate—I made the reference in due legal form, and carried the matter before the magistrate), Callippus, I say, induced the arbitrator, who had been designated according to the laws, to pronounce his award without taking oath, although I protested that he should give it on oath as the laws ordain, his purpose being that he might be able to say before you, that Lysitheides, a good and worthy man, had already given a decision regarding the matters at issue.